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Abstract 
This paper considers the relationship between yoUlh unemployment, the 'invisible hand', and increasing youth 
dependency. Empirically, it shows that conventional measures of unemployment often conceal more than they reveal. This 
is because they are based on labour force participation rates which differ both between different age, sex, and ethnic 
groups, and across time; and because the analyses are usually cross-sectional. The paper argues that such measures 
contribute to (i) superficial interpretations of the causes ofyoUlh unemployment (and unemployment in general); (ii) 
misleading impressions of the degree to which each group is exposed to (that is, 'carrying' the consequences of) 
unemployment; and therefore can lead to (iii) inappropriate policy responses. An alternative population-based index is 
proposed, and a more illustrative cohort perspective of unemployment is given. In combination with a brief review of 
associated demographic factors, the results place in doubt the current wisdom of permitting the 'invisible hand' to 
manage contemporary unemployment. 
Unemployment in New Zealand: perceptions 
and panaceas 
Figure 1 is derived from Registered Unemployment statis-
tics. While these - in the words of their own compilers -
'are not a reliable source of labom market information' 
(NZES, 1992:2), as a guide they show that between the 
1940s and early 1970s, unemployment did not even regis-
ter on the scale needed to incorporate contemporary rates. 
The first large increase occurred in the six months between 
September 1977 and March 1978, when the numbers of 
registered Wlemployed more than doubl~ from just over 
8,000, to nearly 20,000 (NZES, 1992). 
At that time, no social or economic policies to deal with 
Figure 1. Number on unemployment 
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unemployment were developed.lnstead, politically voiced 
concerns with 'Polynesian overstayers' shifted the empha-
sis from unemployment to one of law and order, and dawn 
raids saw the 'offending parties' rounded up and deported, 
:md migration policy tightened (Spoonley, 1988). 
Over the ensuing years, the continually rising Wlemploy-
mentrate attracted a variety of explanations and responses. 
These ranged from the state's acknowledgment in the early 
1980s that the job shortages were the result of snuctural 
changes beyond the control of the individual2 (Bolger, 
1981), and resulting in a broad range of job creation 
schemes; to, in the mid-1980s, a significant reframing of 
the problem as proof of the success of the state's macr~ 
economic policies, the significant ' labour shedding' re-
flecting IJ!'tviously inefficient industries and management 
practices3 (Treasury, 1987; OECD Economic Survey, 
1988-89:38-41); and, by 1991 , to a major concern that a 
'culrure of dependency· was at the root of the problem 
(New Zealand Business Roundtable. 1988, 1990; Shipley 
et al., 1991).4 
In keeping with these increasingly neo-liberal attitudes 
(Oliver 1989; Easton et al .. 1989). there followed a major 
restructuring of the welfare state, accompanied by the 
essentially inter-related Employment Contracts Act 
(Bolger, Richardson, and Birch. 1990; Shipley et al., 1991; 
Boston and Dalziel, 1992; W alsh. 1992; Shirley, 1993 )5. 
The changes encompassed both substantial reductions in 
welfare benefits and severe restrictions in eligibility of 
access to them, which passed a large portion of the respon-
sibility for welfare needs from the State to the 'Core 
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Family';6 a significant attack on the real wage; and a 
massive scaling down of the job schemes, from more than 
42,000 in September 1984 to fewer than 11,000 by March 
1992 (NZES, 1992). 
In 1992, with registered unemployment well over200,000, 
the ·~k of appropriate skiiJs' thesis began to make head-
lines. This was met (some might think, paradoxically) 
with more neo-liberal policy: a significant increase of the 
cost of tertiary education, and greatly restricted elibility 
for student allowances, both of which, needless to say, 
imposed further costs on the family. Finally, in early 1994, 
the first signs of a steadily falling unemployment rate saw 
the 'problem' again revert to the negative, but this time as 
a threat to the much vaunted 'economic recovery.' 8 Since 
then concerns with higher spending (presumably by the 
more securely employed) have returned the policy focus to 
the inflationary effects of this recovery, and falling unem-
ployment is being looked upon with some trepidation. For 
the Free Market experimenters this should not be too much 
cause for concern, however: the Consensus Unemploy-
ment Forecast (given at this conference by the Department 
of Labour) projects a minimum unemployment rate of not 
less than six per cent until at least March 1987. 
There are of course many other explanations of unemploy-
ment. too numerous to mention here. Those that have been 
serve to illustrate the old axiom that how a problem is 
defined (at least politically) by and large determines the 
response. Two important things seem to have been miss-
ing, however. The first is a lack of continuing public 
acknowledgment that New Zealand's relatively high un-
employment in the 1990s (still one of the highest of the 
OECD countries) is an expected consequence of the 
disinflation and trade liberalisation policies which have 
fundamentally underlain the restructuring, and now recov-
ery, of the economy (Treasury, 1987:201-2; OECD Eco-
nomic Survey, 1988-89; Oliver, 1989; Easton et al., 1989; 
Shirley, Easton, Briar and Chatteijee, 1990; Boston and 
Dalziel, 1992; Shirley, 1993). Such policies pertain more 
to the ' law of diminishing returns', whereby strategies to 
improve the profits of capital must be facilitated, in this 
case by the State, than they do to, for example, a culture of 
dependency. The second, and related, point. is that the full 
employment experienced in the advanced capitalist econo-
mies over the 1950s and 1960s by and large owed its 
presence to the post-war boom. The factors which sus-
tained it - the baby boom demand for consumer goods; 
high productivity; and relatively low cost of raw materials, 
- have now slackened and changed, possibly permanently 
(Touraine, 1991:7 -8). 
This brings us to the main point of this paper. In the mid-
1980s it was argued by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD, 1985:9-11) that, 
whatever the specific reasons for unemployment, the phe-
nomenon was going to effect an 'at-risk' generation, 
defmed not in terms of age, but as a cohort born, in most 
OECD countries, between the late 1950s and early 1960s9. 
Since New Zealand's baby boom occurred slightly later 
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and lasted slightly longer than its international counter-
parts (Pool and Sceats, 1981 :9), this argument relates to the 
cohorts born in the early 1970s, those now in their early 
twenties. Arguing that 'it will be years before youth 
unemployment can be brought under control' , the OECD 
proposed that countries develop policies which would 
follow this cohort as a moving target (OECD, 1985:11-
13), a suggestion reiterated by both New Zealand's Popu-
lation Monitoring Group (PMG) in 1986, and its Royal 
Commission on Social Policy (RCSP) in 1988, but appar-
ently disregarded by New Zealand's policy-makers. 
Undoubtedly, the failure to follow such advice can be 
linked to the significant theoretical and ideological shift 
which has taken place in New Zealand's policy-making 
over the past two decades. However, it is equally fair to say 
that two issues contribute quite considerably to the prob-
lem of understanding and responding to unemployment 
the way it is measured; and a lack of appreciation of the 
demographic change which ultimately underpins both the 
supply of, and demand for, labour, and the capacity of the 
family to support its unemployed members (Jackson, 
1994 ). Unless these are incorporated into the analysis of 
unemployment, the decision-making base will be inad-
equate. We turn first to the measurement of unemploy-
ment 
Measuring unemployment 
The first point is that there is not. nor can there be, any 
absolute or definitive measure of either the labour force or 
any component of it, such as unemployment At all times 
these are simply reflections of the definitional criteria 
being used They include: 
1. the defmition of 'work' itself (only formal, 'active' 
engagement); 
2. the hours which denote full- or part -time participation; 
3. whether or not part-time is included in the labour force; 
4. the criteria for determining unemployment 
These issues have been well covered elsewhere, so will not 
be dwelt on here. Suffice it to say that one gets different 
levels of labour force participation and unemployment 
depending on which collection is used and the period of 
observation, and that unemployment is almost always 
underenumerated.1 0 In addition, however, there is a rather 
less commonly discussed problem. Levels of participation 
in the labour force are markedly different for different age-
groups, for men and women, and for different ethnic 
groups (the classification of ethnicity is also very problem-
atic, but cannot be dealt with here). Middle aged males, for 
example, have (historically) higher levels of participation 
than either younger males or women of their own age; men 
in general have higher participation rates than women; and 
Maori and Pacific Islanders have sometimes higher. some-
times lower, levels of participation than their Pakeha 
counterparts. Since 1986, participation rates have fallen 
for almost all groups, but considerably more so for Maori, 
Pacific Islanders, and 15-19 year olds. Comparisons of 
labour force-based unemployment between each group are 
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thus considerably compromised. Moreover, they give only 
tbe 'incidence' ofunemployment(tbenumberofcasesper 
those 'working'), not its 'prevalence' (the level of expo-
sure that a group must accommodate). 
In the statistical analysis that follows I will use both labour 
force and population denominatcxs. My rationale for using 
the latter is that it 'controls' f<r many of the problems just 
mentioned: thedenominakris always relative to the actual 
nmnber of people in any age- sex- ethnic-group, not 
merely those pa1 ticipating in the labour force, and it 
simultaneously gives the 'level of exposure' to unemploy-
ment of each group.11 I am familiar with the arguments 
which oppose this measure, maintaining that only those 
who are in the labour force can ever be considered as 
unemployed, or even 'exposed to the risk' of becoming 
unemployed. I would like therefore to make a distinction 
between the economic measurement of unemployment 
(which pertains to stocks and flows), and the social meas-
urement (which pertains to unemployed people), where-
upon the impact of unemployment on a group can be more 
validly ascertained. At the micro-level, where the experi-
ence of unemployment is lived out, it is all these people 
who must accommodate the consequences of this expo-
sure. 
Figures 2 and 3 compare unemployment by age and sex, 
using first the labour force-based, and then the population-
base(L measure.12 It can be seen that when the labour force 
denominator is used, the 15-19 year old unemployment 
rate shows a steep incline over the 19~91 period; but 
when the population denominator is used, the trajectory 
between these points 'drops' dramatically (in 1991, to 1 in 
8, as opposed to 1 in 4 with the labour force measure). As 
can be inferred from above, this occurs simply because 
those who are not in the labour force cannot appear in the 
Figure 2. Unemployed as percentage of age-group in labour force, by sex, 1976 to 1991. 
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Figure 3. Unemployed as percentage of total age-group, by sex, 1976 to 1991 
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unemployment numerator (it stays the same for both 
measmes), but they do so in the population denominator. 
Since the population denominator is considerably larger 
than the labour force denominator, it makes the unemploy-
ment rate drop, or appear to. The inclusion of part-time 
work in the labour force since 1986 adds a fmther dimen-
sion to this situation. Obviously, the larger the denomina-
tor. the lower the level of unemployment will appear to be. 
Because part-time unemployment is generally lower than 
fulltime, when part-time unemployment is added to the 
numerator, and part-time employment plus unemploy-
ment to the denomfftor, the resulting unemployment rate 
is lowered fmther. 
Conversely, the population based measure scarcely alters 
the 20-24 year and older unemployment trajectories. This 
reflects both the higher labour force participation rates of 
these age groups, and the fact that relatively greater num-
bers of the potential unemployed are already included in 
this measure. It also, however, identifies the very heavy 
burden of actual unemployment being carried by 20-24 
yearolds (1 in 8, the same as 15-19 yearolds), a perspective 
which contrasts significantly with the labour force based 
measure. This is the cohort identified by the OECD, the 
PMG, and the RCSP. 
Clearly. what is shown in figure 3 was not a true improve-
ment in youth unemployment between 1986 and 1991, as 
JaFS and Registered Unemployed statistics confirm. 
Rather, it would appear that we have reached somewhere 
near saturation amongst the teenage population, potential 
unemployment undoubtedly hiding in schools, tertiary 
institutions, and in those job schemes still available, amongst 
discouraged workers, young mothers, etc (Horsfield and 
Evans, 1988). While some of this may be advantageous in 
the long run, it should not be overlooked that such people 
become 'invisible • statistics: with the age of eligibility for 
the adult rate of unemployment benefit now 25 years, these 
persons in reality constitute varying degtees of 'invisible' 
dependency, on their parents, spouses or partners. As 
figure 4 shows, this is a factor which has considerable 
pertinence for the Maori and Pacific Islands populations, 
for whom proportionately greater numbers of youth ap-
pear to be staying out of the labour force. 
In relation to the notion of youth dependency is another 
perspective of unemployment, that of the proportion of all 
unemployment that each age-group carries. Figure 5 shows 
that while 15-24 year olds carried 62 per cent of all 
unemployment in 1976, by 1991 this was down to44 per 
cent The older age-groups, to which their parents belong, 
have been increasing their share, from 38 per cent in 1976 
Figure 4. Male unemployment*: percent of age group in population by ethnicity, 1976 
to 1991 
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Figure 5. Age distribution of total unemployment*, 1976 to 1991 
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Figure 6. Unemployment* rates for 15-24 year (youth) and 35-54 (parental) age 
groups, by sex and ethnicity, 1976 to 1991, population denominator 
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Figure 7. Unemployment by cohort, female, labour force* denominator 
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to 56 per cent in 1991. The key 'parental-age' groups of 
current 15-24 year olds (those aged 35-54 years) cany 
around 26 per cent of all unemploymen~ up from 16 
pe~cent in 1976, a factor which undoubtedly affects their 
ability to accommodate the unemployment of their off-
spring. Using population-based rates, figure 6 shows that 
this also is particularly marked by ethnicity. Maori and 
Pacific Island parental-age males, for example, have un-
employment levels which are almost as high as those of 
their 'offspring' generation 
The implications for each ethnic population of these differ-
entials become clearer when reviewed by cohort, an ap-
proach which permits us to trace the cumulative exposure 
of aggregate groups defined by age, sex, and ethnicity, as 
they pass through their life cycle.14 For example, and 
moving back to the labour force denominator for a mo-
men~ figure 7a shows that Maori women currently in their 
mid-thirties (the cohort born 1957 -61) have been exposed 
to levels of unemployment double those of the Great 
Depression average (8.5%15• RCSP, 1988:172-3), ever 
since 197 6; and their Pacific Island, and male coWlterparts 
(figure 7b), to levels not much lower. Moreover, instead of 
unemployment rates having fallen once past the younger 
age-groups, as the cross-sectional perspective would sug-
ges~ they have risen overall and far more so for Maori and 
Pacific Islanders than for Pakeha Note that I use the LF 
measure here only to illustrate a specific point: depression-
level Wlemployment must be seen as distress-level. This is 
particularly pertinent for the Maori and Pacific Island 
cohorts which are younger again, those born 1962-66 and 
1967-71. 
When the population-based measure is used (figure 8), the 
equivalent exposure for Maori (both males and females) in 
the 1957-61 cohort has never been less than one in thirteen, 
and currently, is one in eight females and one in six males. 
For Pakeha in this same cohort, exposure has never been 
more than one in twenty females and one in sixteen males: 
the current situation. Given the constraints of space it is 
impossible to go into much detail here, or to explain the 
finer points of the differences between the two measures. 
Perhaps most ~uccinctly it can be noted that irrespective of 
the measure u~ the most recent observation (represent-
ing 1991) for each Pakeha cohort seldom reaches above the 
rates experienced by the Maori and Pacific Island cohorts 
at their first and/or lowest observations; and that this has 
become increasingly true.16 
Most of these data have been drawn from the past four 
censuses. the last of which was in 1991. Unemployment 
has shown some improvement in the 1993-94 year, but for 
15-19 and 20-24 year olds, this is as yet minimal. Partici-
pation rates at these ages also remain below their 1991 
levels {HLFS, June 1994 ). The objective of this part of the 
paper, however, was not to dwell on the various indices 
and their discrepancies, but to illustrate that the economic, 
labour force measure of unemployment does not necessar-
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ily give the full picture- it can conceal as much as it 
reveals- and that the conventional cross-sectional ap-
proach further confounds this situation. As noted, another 
factor which is very important for analysing \Dlemploy-
ment is that of demographic change, and it is to this we now 
tmn. 
Adding in demographic factors 
Demographic change has particular implications for un-
derstanding the dynamics of the labour market, because 
labour supply is usually considered in terms of 'propensity 
to work' (actual participation) at a single point in time, 
rather than the continuous dynamics of demographic sup-
ply. Between 1976 and 1991, the working-age population 
(15-64 years) grew by 16percent. At the beginning of this 
period. the largest of the baby boom cohorts (born around 
1961) arrived at the door of the labour market, at a rate of 
around 60,00) per year. Between then and now, more than 
1.2 million individuals have turned 15-19 years and also 
arrived, to a labour force itself numbering around 1.5 
million. Over these same years, fewer than 600,000 have 
turned 60 and begun to leave the labour force. Thus, more 
than half a million new jobs were needed over the period 
to accommodate youth labour market entrants alone. Yet, 
as figure 9 illustrates, in 1991, only 5,000 more individuals 
(of all ages) than in 197 6 identified themselves as working 
full time (mostly accounted for by a fall of 80,000 fulltime 
jobs at 15-19 years), while of the 98,000 new part-time 
positions which had appeared, only 25,000 had gone to 
youth. 
Moreover, while those currently aged 15-24 were born in 
the early 1970s, when Pakeha birth rates were in fact at 
their lowest since the peak of the baby boom, because of 
the convergence of other demographic factors 17 their 
actual numbers are only slightly smaller (around -8% on 
reaching the labour market) than those of their 1961 
counterparts. When the former began to arrive at the labour 
market in the mid-1980s - the very moment that the 
massive and simultaneous exercises in 'labour shedding' 
and State facilitation of free market forces began in ear-
nest- they foWld a labour force already engorged by the 
large cohorts which had preceded them (refer again to end-
note 9). For Maori and Pacific Islanders- who did not 
even take part in the baby boom - the situation is even 
worse. Due to significant differences in the timing and 
velocity of their respective fertility declines, and for Pa-
cific Islanders the added effects of migration, in 1991 their 
largest cohorts were still entering the labour market. At 
this time, the Maori 15-24 year population was 22 per cent 
larger than in 1976, while for Pacific Islanders it was 130 
per cent. 
This sort of simple 'political ari thmetick' 18 makes notions 
of 'dependency culture', lack of skills etc., rather invidi-
ous. Certainly, it illustrates a factor that the invisible hanq 
is ill-equipped to deal with: the differing lag-times of 
population and economic cycles; and it is here that I see a 
major potential for polarisation. To understand this it is 
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Figure 9. Size of working-age, fulltime and part-time populations, 1976-1991 
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necessary to shift the present focus from population growth 
to population composition.First, the differences in fertility 
and migration translate into different age-structures for 
each of New Zealand's sub-populations. 1be median age 
of both the Maori and Pacific Island populations is around 
21 years; for Pakeha it is 33 years .. 1bese differences 
exacerbate the effects of higher age-specific unemploy-
ment rates. That is, it is not just that Maori and Pacific 
Island age-specific unemployment rates are higher, but 
that unemployment is inversely proportioned to age, and a 
greater proportion of these populations are younger. Sec-
ond, when some of the more recent policy responses are 
added to the analysis, their considerably greater impact on 
the Maori and Pacific Island populations can be appreci-
ated In 1991, 34 per cent of the adult Maori population 
(15+ years) and 32 per cent of the adult Pacific Island 
population were aged 15-24 years, compared with only 19 
per cent of Pakeha. The raising of the age of eligibility for 
the adult rate of unemployment benefit to 25 years was 
thus extremely discriminatory on this point alone, without 
even considering the ethnic maldistribution of unemploy-
ment To really appreciate the potential implications of 
these composition effects, however. we need to turn to 
some micro-level analogues of demographic change. 
Reflecting the differing age-structures, in 1991 three quar-
ters ofMaori households and 83% of Pacific Island house-
holds had usually-resident children, compared with less 
than half of Pakeha households; and within these house-
holds, 84 per cent ofMaori and 86% of Pacific Island, but 
only 69 per cent of Pakeha households, had children under 
the age of 16 years (Jackson and Pool, 1994). Of older 
offspring, population ratios show that Maori and Pacific 
Islanders in the 35-54 year parental-age group were almost 
twice as likely as their Pakeha counterparts to be associ-
ated with a 15-24 year old. Even if the unemployment 
experiences of these populations were the same, there 
would be considerable differences in their youth depend-
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ency ratios. However, as shown, the younger the 'parent', 
the more likely he or she is to be unemployed, and this is 
particularly pertinent for Maori parents who, on average, 
have their children at considerably younger ages than 
Pakeha. 19 Clearly, Maori and Pacific Island parents will 
be in a considerably worse position than Pakeha parents, to 
support their unemployed youth. 
When we add the fact that Maori women in the 1957-61 
cohort also have, for example, the highest levels of sole 
parenting, both cumulatively and currently, and the third 
taining to the same 'scale' (the actual population at age x) 
can be more readily added, thus providing a far more 
comprehensive base upon which to develop appropriate 
policy responses. There are of course many such variables. 
In my (ongoing) research which compares the experiences 
of forty parental-age cohorts across a broad range of 
population-based socio-demographic indicators, only four 
Maori and no Pacific Island cohorts appear in the twenty 
most advantaged positions, while only two Pakeha cohorts 
fall into the twenty least advantaged (Jackson, 1994). 
There is significant evidence of 'eth-class' (Miles and 
Spoonley, 1982) and polarisation, both of which stand to 
be exacerbated by current policy directions. 
Conclusion 
Conventional age, sex, and ethnic comparisons of unem-
ployment based on labour market participation are seri-
ously compromised, in that they conceal important differ-
ences in participation between these groups. Whilst they 
may be acceptable for the purposes of labour market 
analysis, where they influence the interpretation of and 
response to unemployment, their limitations need to be 
fully appreciated. For comparative purposes a population-
based, or social, measure, offers a more refined index, and 
can more readily identify the extent to which a sub-
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population must accommodate the consequences of unem-
ployment. 
For some groups high unemployment is not an experience 
isolated to a point in time, but one which can be experi-
enced through time. The Maori and Pacific Island cohorts 
which contain the younger parents of current 15-24 year 
olds (and forthcoming labour marlcet entrants) have them-
selves experienced high and increasing levels of unem-
ployment, ever since their own youth. For many the 
cwnulative effects of this, in combination with other 
highly relevant demographic factors, must seriously affect 
their ability to support their unemployed youth, as required 
tluougb the recent changes to the welfare state . 
Finally, many years pass between the birth of a cohort and 
its eventual arrival at the labour market. Yet once 'on the 
gromtd', the cohort's size, characteristics, and the poten-
tial implications of these can be estimated over all of these 
years, a point clearly made by the OECD. Given New 
Zealand's control over migration, cohort size is the one 
thing which is more or less predictable, and to which 
policies can be addressed to lessen the effects of changes 
in the political economy. That the architects of these 
changes responded to the unemployment associated with 
them in the manner they did means that not only the 
unemployment, but the policies also, will have a differen-
tiating effect on the population. In incorporating demo-
graphic change, a social measure of unemployment would 
go some distance towards providing a comprehensive base 
for the development and evaluation of future socio-eco-
nomic policy. 
Future research 
Each of these issues invites future research. As I have 
written this paper, focusing so much on the denominator 
aspects of measuring unemployment, I have become in-
creasingly uncomfortable with the numerator. As noted, 
only those who are in the labour force can be enumerated 
as unemployed, yet, as the comparison between the labour 
force-based and the population-based measures, and other 
studies, illustrate, a sizable number of 'potentially unem-
ployed' have, since around 1986, simply not entered the 
labour force. in order to gain a more valid social measure 
of the unemployment-related dependency or vulnerability 
being carried by each sub-population group, it may be 
more useful to move to a numerator which includes both 
the unemployed, and those not in the labour force, as Brian 
Easton is cmrently doing (personal communication). 
It is possible that the use of such population-based social 
measures of labour force status may further permit the 
development of a composite socio-demographic index, 
wherein the complexities of the social outcomes of Free 
Market policies may be able to be comprehensively iden-
tified and monitored.20 The cohort analysis, also, has 
much to offer labour market analysts in terms of life-time 
person-hours in or out of the labour force, using fulltime 
and part-time status, etc., and would seem a very necessary 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
basis for any analysis by sex. Finally, the differing m omenta 
of demographic and economic cycles are increasingly 
interesting. Data from both fields demonstrate short and 
long run trends which appear to sometimes parallel, some-
times mirror, each other. The theoretical and explanatory 
frameworks of each may thus have much to offer the other, 
and it may be only through such interdisciplinary, prefer-
ably collaborative, research, that these phenomena will be 
satisfactorily explained. 
References 
Bolger, J.B. 1981 Jobs and People. The Government's 
Employment Strategy. Wellington: Government 
Printer, JWle. 
Bolger, J.B., Richardson, R. and Birch, W .F. 1990 
Economic and Social Initiatives. Statements to the 
House of Representatives. Wellington, December. 
Boston, J. and Dalziel, P. (eds)., 1992The Decent Soci-
ety? Essays in Response to National's Economic 
and Social Policies. Auckland: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dixoo, S. 1993 Alternative Measures of Employment and 
Unemployment Key Statistics, March:9-16. 
Easton,B (ed). 1989 The Making ofRogernomics. Auck-
land: Auckland University Press. 
Horsfreld, A., and Evans, M. 1988 Maori Women in the 
Economy. Te Ohu Wbakatapu Ministry of Wom-
en's Affairs, Wellington. 
Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) Wellington: 
Department of Statistics. 
Jacksoo, N.0.1994 Youth Unemployment and the Core 
Family. Population, Policy, and Political Economy. 
Unpublished Masters Thesis, University ofW aikato. 
Jacksoo, N.O. and Pool, I. 1994 Fertility and Family 
Formation in the Second Demographic Transition. 
New Zealand Trends and Patterns. Report prepared 
for Social Research and Development Unit, Wel-
lington. 
Jacksoo, N.O., Pool, 1., and Cheung, M. C. 1994 Maori 
andNon-Maori Fertility: Convergence ,Divergence, 
or Parallel Trends? Discussion Paper No.3. Popu-
lation Studies Centre, U Diversity of W aikato, Ham-
ilton, December. 
Loomis, T. 1990 Pacific Migrant Labour. Class and 
Racism in New Zealand. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Miles, R., and Spoooley, P.1985 The Political Economy 
of Labour Migration: An Alternative to the Sociol-
185 
ogy of 'Race' and 'Ethnic Relations' in New Zea-
land. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Soci-
ology, 121(1). March. 
New Zealand Business Roundtable. 1988 Labour Mar-
kets and Employment. Statements on Labour Rela-
tions. Wellington: New Zealand Business 
Roundtab1e. 
New Zealand Business Roundtable. 1990. U nemploy-
ment. Realities and Illusions. Wellington: New 
Zealand Business Roundtable, December. 
New Zealand Employment Service (NZES). 1992 La-
bour MarketlnformationHandout. Operations and 
Policy Uni~ July. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD). 1985New Po/iciesF or the Young. 
Paris. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD). 1989 Economic Surveys. New 
Zealand 1988-19. France. 
Pool, I., and Sceats, J. 1981 Fertility and Family Forma-
tion in New Zealand. An Examination of Data 
Collection and Analyses. Wellington: Ministry of 
Works and Development, August. 
Population Monitoring Group (PMG). 1986 The New 
Zealand Population: Change, Composition, and 
Policy Implications. Report No.4. Wellington: New 
Zealand Planning Council. 
Rankin, K. 1990 New Zealand's Labour Supply in a Long 
Term Perspective. A paper presented to the New 
Zealand Association of Economists 
Sesquicentennial Conference, University of Auck-
land, August 22. 
Royal Commiwon on Social Policy (RCSP). 1988 The 
April Report. New Zealand Today. Volume 1. 
Wellington: Royal Commission on Social Policy. 
Shipley, J. et.al. 1991aWelfare That Works. A Statement 
of Government Policy on Social Assistance. Wel-
lington: Government Printer. 
Shirley, I. Easton, B. Briar, C. and Chatterjee, S. 
19CXJUnemployment in New Zealand. Dunrnore 
Press. 
Shirley, I. 1993 Experiments in the New Zealand Labora-
tory. Paper presented at the Conference on Com-
parative Research on Welfare States in Transition, 
Oxford University. 9-12 September. 
Spoonley, P. 1988 Racism and Ethnicity. Auckland: Ox-
ford University Press. 
186 
Thompson, B. 1985 The Industrial Structure of the 
Workforce. In Population of New Zealand. Coun-
try Monograph Series No.l2. Volume 2. ESCAP, 
United nations. 
Touraine, A. 1991 Preface. In Facing the Future. Young 
People and Unemployment around the World. Paris, 
UNESCO. 
Treasury. 1987 Government Management. Brief to the 
Incoming Government, Voll. 
Walsh, P. 1992 The Employment Contracts Act In Bos-
ton, J. and Dalziel, P. The Decent Society? Essays 
in Response to National's Economic and Social 
Policies. Auckland: Oxford University Press. 
Wesbate, C. 1956 The Economic Record. Economic 
Society of Australia and New Zealand, Melbomne 
University Press, May: 139-141. 
Notes 
1 Certainly little was mentioned about the active recruit-
ment of these people for the specific labour needs of capital 
in the preceding years (Miles and Spoonley, 1985; 
Spoonley, 1988; Loomis, 1990). 
2 Around 50,000 registered unemployed. 
3 Around 100,000 registered unemployed. 
4 With around 180,000 registered unemployed, the annex 
to the 1991 Budget which outlined the restructuring of the 
welfare state ('Welfare That Works' , Shipley et al., 1991) 
recorded that large numbers of individuals appeared to 
prefer a culture of dependency ahead of self reliance, a 
situation which the State, 'in the interests of all New 
Zealanders' needed to provide 'sufficient motivation to 
move from State dependence to independence' (Shipley et 
al.. 1991:4,25). Indeed. in this 87-page document it is 
possible to count no fewer than 72 references which charge 
that beneficiaries are intent on cheating the system. The 
phrase 'fraud and abuse'. for example, is used fourteen 
times, and a rather divisive distinction between those 
' ordinary, honest New Zealanders' whose taxes provide 
the welfare benefits, and those who receive them, is made 
in thirteen places. The word unemployment, used about six 
times, is generally accompanied by the somewhat circular 
suggestion that benefits are its root cause. 
5 The architects of the changes made this inter-relation-
ship quite explicit 'For many people the generosity of the 
benefit system has become a poverty trap. Benefit pay-
ments have been hight enough in relation to wages that for 
many people there has been little encouragement to take on 
paid wor~ and employers have been unable to attract 
workers at rates which would maintain the viability of their 
businesses. Our changes to benefits and the reforms of the 
labour market through the Employment Contracts Act are 
setting the scene for a new and more effective approach. 
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(ill) only 74 per cent of those wbo descnDed themselves as 
unemployed in the 1991 census were officially accepted as 
such (Jactsoo, 1994). Thus, whenever we are talking 
about 'unemployment', we are clearly dealing with a 
serious underenmnezation. The 'jobless' is probably more 
accurate, but this also excludes (i) and (ii). 
1 The pocess of standardisation, where the experience 
f the one population is computed as if it had the same age-s 
bUcture as the othez, is insufficient to gain this perspect-
ive. 
12 Unless sourced otherwise, all data used in this paper 
come from my Masters thesis (Jackson 1994) which used 
a customised census database compiled by Statistics NZ 
for the Population Studies Centre, University of W aikato. 
For 1976 and 1981, 'unemployment' and 'labour force' 
refers to Fulltime only. For 1986 and 1991. they refer to 
FulltimePLUS Part-time. Ethnic classification is based on 
an hienm:hical procedure which prioritises first to Mam. 
then Pacific Island, then 'Other', then Pakeha 
3 The addition of part-time into the labour force has 
nevertheless addressed some important issues, for exam-
ple, the contribution that women make to the labour force 
and the economy. 
14 Demographic cohorts are not 'closed' popnlations. 
People enter them by migration and leave by migration and 
death. This is, however, more or less irrelevant to the 
present discussion, which is concerned with the impact of 
unemployment and unemployment-related policy changes 
on each sub-population as a whole. It is, nevertheless, fair 
to assume that a core of the same people are present for 
much of their life cycle. 
15 It is difficult to be definitive about this level. Thompson 
(1985:132) gives this as 12%; Rankin (1990:2) as 33%; 
while W estrate in the Economic Record (1956: 140) records 
the September 1932 level as 10.8% of the male labour 
force. Each are based on different criteri~ and tend to 
pertain to males. The Royal Commission on Social Policy 
(1988:172-3), however, records the conservative 8.5% 
used here. 
16 In the population-based measures the last age-span of 
the youngest cohorts reflects a point made earlier, that 
large numbers of 'potentially unemployed' youth are un-
doubtedly missing from the numerator. Thus these trajec-
taies differ (between the two measures) for the younger 
cohorts more than they do for the older cohorts . 
. 17 The first large coha:ts of the baby boom began to have 
their own children, and whilst they were having fewer 
children than their own mothers had, there were more of 
them (women reaching childbearing age). 
18 'Political Arithmetick' was a phrase coined by wmiam 
Petty in the late 1600s. The concept refers to the interest of 
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the State in the composition of its population, and its 
principles underlie modern political economy. 
19 Currently more than seven years separate the peak 
childbearing years of Maori and non-Maori, these occur-
ring at approximately 21 years f<r Maori and 28 for non-
Mam (Jackson, Pool, and Cheung, 1994) 
20 The topic of my doctoral research, currently being 
undertaken at the Australian National University, Can-
bena. 
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